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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
*

Appeal No. 920766-CA

Plaintiff/Respondent,
*

vs.
*
BRAD EDWARDS and
BRANDON GEARY,

Priority No. 16

*

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
# # # # # # #

AUTHORITY CONFERRING JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated as
amended.

This case is subject to transfer to the Court of Appeals

pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) and Section 78-28-3(2) (j ) of the Utah
Code Annotated as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The District Court committed error in granting a Summary
Judgment to the plaintiff when there were material issues of fact
to be determined at the time of trial.
The District Court committed error in ruling that the plea of
guilty entered by Brad Edwards to aggravated assault was conclusive
as to whether or not Brad Edwards committed an intentional act and
1

that even if Brad Edwards did not intend to hit Brandon Geary, he
could have expected the results.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon review of a grant of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court of Appeals applies the same standard as that applied by the
trial court.

The appellate court must review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the losing party, and affirm only where it
appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material issue
of fact or where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

The Court of Appeals has a right to review the

Conclusions of Law for correctness without according deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions.

Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d

281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764
P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); and Daniels v. Deseret Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

DIMINUTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES
Section 76-5-102(1)(c)
(1) Assault is;
(c) An act, committed without unlawful force or
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another.
Section 76-5-103(1)(b)
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(b) Used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 or other means of force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
This appeal is from a final Order of Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

granting the plaintiff/respondentfs Motion for Summary Judgment in
an action to determine insurance coverage for the acts of Brad
Edwards.
B.

Course of Proceedings:
On

about

the

17th

day

of

plaintiff/respondent,

State

Farm

Fire

September,
and

1990,

Casualty

the

Company,

hereinafter referred to as State Farm, filed a Complaint in this
action naming Brad Edwards and the appellant, hereinafter referred
to as Brandon Geary, as defendants.

The insurance company sought

a ruling from the court that it was not financially responsible for
the actions of Brad Edwards who was covered under a home owner's
insurance policy. Brandon Geary filed an Answer to the Complaint.
Brad Edwards was not represented by an attorney and did not file
an Answer to the Complaint.

On the 18th day of April, 1991,

Brandon Geary filed a Motion to Intervene on behalf of Brad Edwards
with a supporting Memorandum and a Request for Oral Argument. The
court did not rule on Brandon Geary's Motion to Intervene and a
default was not entered against Brad Edwards.

State Farm filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment with a supporting Memorandum. Brandon
Geary filed a Responsive Memorandum and the matter was argued
before the District Court on the 7th day of July, 1992, before
Judge Douglas Cornaby,

Judge Cornaby granted the State Farm's

3

Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a Memorandum Decision on
July 8, 1992.

An Order granting summary judgment was signed by

Judge Cornaby in this matter on the 8th day of July, 1992, and
filed with the court on the 22nd day of July, 1992.
Brandon Geary filed an appeal in this matter on the 21st day
of August, 1992.

On November 2, 1992, the Supreme Court entered

an Order transferring this case to the Court of Appeals for a
disposition.
C.

Disposition of Trial Court:
Judge Douglas Cornaby granted State Farm's Motion for Summary

Judgment, finding that Brad Edwards' actions were intentional and
therefore excluded from the home owner's policy.

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES.
The

plaintiff/respondent,

State

Farm

Fire

and

Casualty

Company, shall hereinafter be referred to as State Farm.

The

defendant/appellant, Brandon Geary, shall hereinafter be referred
to as Brandon Geary.

The defendant Brad Edwards is not a party to

this appeal and will be referred to as Brad Edwards.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about the 4th day of September, 1989, Brad Edwards

discharged a loaded shotgun in the direction of Brandon Geary,
striking him in the chest and upper body.
2.

Brad Edwards was charged by the State of Utah with

attempted homicide and entered into a plea negotiation with the
4

State of Utah whereby he plead guilty to an aggravated assault, a
third degree felony.
3.

On the 24th day of January, 1990, Brad Edwards entered

a plea of guilty to aggravated assault and signed a "Statement by
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty", a copy of which is
attached in the Addendum hereto. At the time Brad Edwards entered
his

plea,

he

represented

in

open

court

that

he

did

not

intentionally shot Brandon Geary, but intended to scare him by
shooting in close proximity to him and accidentally struck him with
the shot.

ff

Brad Edwards stated:

. . . I told him I am pleading

guilty to the aggravated assault, but I didn't do it on purpose.
I was not pleading guilty to shooting him on purpose. I was taking
the best choice."
4.

(Deposition of Brad Edwards, Pg. 39, L. 1 - 1 4 ) .

Brandon Geary filed a lawsuit against Brad Edwards in the

Davis County District Court on or about the 8th day of May, 1990,
identified as Civil No. 900747669 PI.
5.

On or about the 17th day of September, 1990, the

plaintiff filed a Complaint in this action naming Brad Edwards and
Brandon Geary as defendants. Brandon Geary filed an Answer to the
Complaint.

Brad Edwards was not represented by counsel.

Brad

Edwards was provided an attorney by State Farm Insurance Company
in the civil case referred to in Paragraph 4 hereof. However, said
attorney did not file an answer in this action on behalf of Brad
Edwards.
6.

Brandon Geary filed a Motion to Intervene on behalf of

Brad Edwards on the 18th day of April, 1991, with a supporting
5

Memorandum.

To this date there has been no ruling on the Motion

to Intervene and the defendant has not been given the opportunity
to argue the Motion to Intervene.
7.

After having received Memoranda and hearing argument in

this case, Judge Douglas L. Cornaby, on July 8, 1992, granted State
Farm's Motion for a Summary Judgment and entered a "Ruling on
Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusions and Decree", a copy of
which is included in the Addendum hereto.
8.

A jury trial was held in the case of Brandon Geary v.

Brad Edwards, Civil No. 900747669 PI before Judge Jon M. Memmott
on the 21st day of October, 1992. At the conclusion of the trial,
Judge Memmott granted Brad Edwards' Motion to dismiss Brandon
Geary's cause of action for an intentional tort.

The issue of

negligence was submitted to the jury and they returned a verdict
finding that Brad Edwards was negligent and that his negligence
constituted 90 percent of the fault.

A copy of the jury verdict

is enclosed in the Addendum hereto.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A summary judgment should not be granted if there is any

genuine issue as to any material fact.

There are issues of

disputed fact in this case; and, therefore, the court committed
error in granting a summary judgment.
2.

The court committed error in concluding that Brad Edwards

intended to shoot and/or injure Brandon Geary because of a plea
Brad Edwards entered to an aggravated assault charge.
6

Aggravated

assault can consist of using force which creates a substantial risk
of bodily injury.

Brad Edwards testified that he did not intend

to shoot or harm Brandon Geary; therefore, an issue of fact existed
which should have been submitted to the trier of fact.
3.

Brad Edwards testified that he did not intend to shoot

and did not expect or intend to injure Brandon Geary,

The trial

court committed error in ruling that Brad Edwards could have
expected the results because he intentionally picked up the gun,
pointed it, and fired it.

An exclusion clause in an insurance

policy should be construed against the insurance company and the
company has the burden of demonstrating that Brad Edwards intended
to shoot and expected or intended to injure Brandon Geary.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STANDARD OF PROOF
Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on a
summary judgment motion the plaintiff has the burden of proving to
the trial court that no genuine issue as to any material fact
exists and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
1984).

Frisbee v. Kay & Kay Construction Co,, 676 P.2d 384 (Utah
Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the opposing party.

Reliable

Furniture Co. v. Fidelity S Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 398
P.2d 685 (Utah 1965).

Finally, courts should be reluctant to

7

invoke the remedy of summary judgment.

Brandt v. Springville

Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460 (Utah 1960).
The appellant alleges that there was a material issue of fact
as to whether or not Brad Edwards intended to shoot the appellant
and whether or not Brad Edwards' actions could be expected to cause
bodily injury to the appellant.

The evidence presented before the

trial court in the form of a deposition taken of Brad Edwards
clearly raised disputed issues of fact which had to be viewed in
a light most favorable to the appellant.

Consequently, the court

committed error in granting a summary judgment and denying the
appellant an opportunity for a trial on those issues.

POINT II
BRAD EDWARDS1 PLEA OF GUILTY TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
WAS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE ISSUE OF INTENT.
State Farm, in its motion before the District Court, argued
that the District Court should assume that Brad Edwards shot
Brandon Geary intentionally because of the plea he entered to
aggravated assault.

Judge Douglas Cornaby, in his Memorandum

Decision granting summary judgment, stated:

"Mr. Edwards plead

guilty to intentionally injuring Mr. Geary. He cannot now explain
away that plea."

(Pg 1, "Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment,

Conclusions, and Decree").

Brad Edwards was originally charged

with attempted homicide, a second degree felony.

That plea was

negotiated down to a charge of aggravated assault, a third degree
felony.

On the 24th day of January, 1990, Brad Edwards entered a

plea to the aggravated assault and signed a "Statement by Defendant
8
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Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,
I d o b o d i l y i n j u r y t o another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of
"bodily in j ury to another •
Section 76-5-103 o f the otah Code Anno tate J ; •
assa/i ill t: a s :
(-1 ) A p e r s o n c o m m i t s aggr avated assault: if he commi ts
assault as defined in Secti on 76- 5-3 02 and h e :
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(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury.
Under Utah State Law in effect at the time Brad Edwards
entered his plea of guilty, he could be guilty of an aggravated
assault if he committed an act with unlawful force or violence that
causes or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
The State law did not require that Brad Edwards intend to cause
bodily injury to another.

Paragraph 4 of the "Statement by

Defendant in Advance of Plea" signed by Brad Edwards states that
the elements of the statements prove are:
(1) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; and
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another.
The

elements

aggravated assault.

quoted

above

could

constitute

the

act of

However, the defendant could be guilty of

aggravated assault if he created a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another. Brad Edwards, after signing the statement, told
the trial court that he did not intend to shoot or hit Brandon
Geary.

After receiving that explanation from Brad Edwards, not

withstanding the language of the "Statement", the trial court
accepted his plea to the aggravated assault.

This was clearly

permissible by the court since Brad Edwards could be found guilty
of the crime even if he did not intend to shoot or hit Brandon
Geary.

Therefore, it is inappropriate

for Judge Cornaby to

conclude that the plea of guilty entered by Brad Edwards was
conclusive as to the issue of his intent, and that Brad Edwards
10
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BRAD EDWARDS DID NOT INTENTIONALLY SHOT BRANDON GEARY
AND DID NOT EXPECT OR INTEND THAT BRANDON GEARY BE INJURED
BY THE SHOTGUN BLAST.
The sole basir

k

-r State Farm's .MotJ on for Summary • Judgment

was an allegation that Brad Edwards J 1 itentional I.y sho t: Brandon
Geary. The openii ig paragraph of State Far m f s memorandum ii 1 support

Case law is clear in holding that an intentional shooting
falls within the intentional injury exclusion clause of
insurance policies
In the present: case, Brad Edwards
has admitted he intentionally shot Brandon Geary.
Therefore, Brad Edwards' actions are not covered by his
parents 1 homeowner's policy which contains an intentional
injury exclusion clause•
• •
B r a d E d w a r d s 1 a c t i o n s a n d Intent a r e c l e a r l y set forth in h i s
d e p o s l t. 1 0:1:

Brad

Edwards

l o s t i I lleill I n I I

first 1111 e he fired a warning shot

Il II

: a: <-•

m

*

| i, 1 |

i i m . ,

Brandon Ge a r y ,

aiming the shot at the ground.

In this regard Brad Edwards

stated:
Q.

You then take the gun and do what with it?

A.

Point it out the window. Not at them, but at
a direction, and I fired a warning shot to
scare them off.

Q.

Where did you think the warning shot went?

A.

It went in the ground.

(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P. 30, L. 4-8)
A second shot was then fired.

Regarding this shot, Brad Edwards

stated:
Q.

Did you see him look over his rear shoulder?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

An what was your intent of that shot?

A.

To scare them away.

Q.

And where you aiming the shot?

A.

The same place.

And I shot another shot.

(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P. 31, L. 11-16)
Brad Edwards was specifically asked if he intended to shot Brandon
Geary.

He stated:

Q.

So it was not your intent at the time that you
actually struck Brandon to hit him?

A.

No, I was just trying to scare him like they
were scaring me. . . .

(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P. 35, L. 10-22)
Q.

. . . What I am going to ask you, at the time
that you fired the shotgun that actually hit
Brandon Geary, was it your intent to strike him
with the pellets from the shotgun?

A.

No sir.
12

yjm

you 1 -

vas

--*AT**

<*

- r .1 •

-

>-

A.

(Depositicn
Brad
ShO

Edward

•:

I.J11 i..l J i I

t Q l I n,

7

* Hr 'id t JM a 'i
* ^c+|fioH

In J1' M i I ' . I

t^^t

i i 'Ci'' i <:: ; i

-,

i • :::i i

(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P

c i n

)

•

"^1 i ^ v e

ii y ji

48 I

t h a t : the

' " » : :| i ^ ^ -lO.

i ' «

I ? W B L ]( •

7 1 8).

Cc I nisei! lor Ctate Pann questioned Brad Edwards and asked him
whether he ii itentionally fired the gi in.

Brad Edwar ds responded as

follows:

• •
Ai id y o u ii iter ltioi :taJ ] y f I i: ed t:l: le Gi n l ? Whether
yoi I tried
to 1 ::! HI them
or i iot,
you
intentionally fired the g un; i s t:l lat correct?
Intentionally J i: I another direction, yes, sir

*

Well, if I shot the gun, yeah, that's correct.
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Louit

.Judge,

dismissed

A jury
l(

P'h'hi.

Brandon

Geary's action for an intentional tort at the conclusion of the
evidence, upon a motion by Brandon Geary's attorney.

The issue of

negligence was submitted to= the jury, who concluded that Brad
Edwards

was

negligent

in

his

act

constituted 90 percent of the fault.

and

that

his

negligence

(A copy of the Jury Verdict

is enclosed in the Addendum hereto).
State Farm claims that liability coverage does not apply to
bodily injury or property damage which

"(1) which is either

expected or intended by an insured or (2) any person or property
which is the result of willful and malicious acts of the insured."
Judge Cornaby ruled that the acts of Brad Edwards were excluded
because:
He intentionally picked up a loaded shot gun.
He
intentionally pointed it in the direction of Mr. Geary.
He intentionally fired.
The first shot missed.
He
intentionally fired a second shot which hit Mr. Geary .
. . Even if Mr. Edwards had not 'intended' to hit Mr.
Geary, he could have 'expected' that it would happen
considering his intentional actions . . . .
It is the position of Brandon Geary that Judge Cornaby erred
in concluding that intentionally picking up a shot gun and firing
it in the direction of Brandon Geary is sufficient to meet the
language of the exclusion. The trial court had no evidence before
it with the exception of the deposition of Brad Edwards and the
"Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea" previously referred to
herein.

Given the statements of Brad Edwards in his deposition,

there was clearly an issue of fact as to whether or not Mr. Edwards
intended to hit Mr. Geary and/or expected that his acts would
injury Mr. Geary.
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intent, regardless of other statements suggesting he d id
intend to injure. We acknowledge that read as a whole
McGrath's affidavit and testimony supports a compelling
and persuasive argument that McGrath did, :l n fact, intend
to injure. However, we are not the trier of the fact and
we are unable to say that reasonable minds could not
reach a different conclusion, and, hence, summary
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sting, but that he did not intend to harm him.

The Court of

Appeals found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the insured intended to cause harm to the victim.

The

court stated:
Under the majority rule the exclusion applies only if the
insured intended to do a particular act, AND intended to
do some harm, even if the harm actually done was
radically different from that intended . . .
On the
other hand, . . . f an intentional injury' exclusion will
not apply if the insured intentionally does an act, but
has no intent to commit harm, even if the act involves
foreseeable consequences of great harm or even amounts
to gross or culpable negligence. Pg. 875.
In Vanguard Insurance Company v. Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Az.
App. 1972), the court dealt with an insurance policy exclusion for
expected or intended injuries. In that case, the defendant robbed
a drive-up liquor store, and as he drove off he fired a shot over
his shoulder in the direction of the store to scare the victim and
to make him duck so that he would not recognize the defendant or
the defendant's car.

The shot struck the victim in his eye.

The

trial court found that the defendant had not intended to cause harm
even though he intended the act of shooting; and that, therefore,
the insurance policy exclusion did not apply and the insurance
company was found liable under its home owner's policy.
The case of Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray, 694 P.2d 259
(Az. App. 1983) involved an insurance policy which had an exclusion
for intentional acts of the insured.

Two parties were involved in

an exchange of words and a fight. The defendant warned the victim
not to come any closer, and when that warning was ignored, took a
gun from his van and shot the victim.
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CONCLUSION
The
Mo Lion for
as

trial

court

committed

Summary .1 <l< iiiiticrnt ,

to whether

or. n o t

error

in

njin i n t l n q

T h e r e was a m a t e r i a l

Brad Edwards i n t e n d e d t o s h o o t
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State

Finn's

I s s u e oi
at,

fact;

strike,

and/or injure Brandon Geary.

The trial court could not conclude

as a matter of law from Brad Edwards plea to aggravated assault
that he

intended

to shoot Brandon Geary

and/or

injure him.

Likewise, the court committed error in concluding that even if Brad
Edwards did not intend to hit Brandon Geary, he could have
"expected" the results.
Under Utah Law, aggravated assault can consist of using
unlawful force which causes a substantial risk of injury.

An

exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy should be construed in
favor of the insured and the insurance company should have the
burden of proving that Brad Edwards intended to shoot Brandon Geary
and to injure him.

Since the evidence before the court clearly

raised a factual issue as to whether Brad Edwards intended to shoot
Brandon Geary and/or intended to injure him, summary judgment was
not appropriate.
Wherefore, Brandon Geary

respectfully

requests

that the

summary judgment be reversed and the matter remanded back to the
District Court for a trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

f

day of December, 1992.

ROBERT A. ECHAfcD
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, this <jf"~
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUL 0 9 1992
IN AND FOR THE
L j l l L b ^ U U Lj LZ
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. ,
Plaintiff,

vs.
BRAD EDWARDS, et al.,
Defendants.

)

RULING ON MOTION FOR

|

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I

CONCLUSIONS, AND DECREE

|

Civil No. 920700021

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was before the
Court for oral argument.
Daniel

D. Anderson

Robert A. Echard.

The plaintiff's position was argued by

and the defendants' position was argued by
After oral argument the Court took the motion

under advisement.
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.
The defendant is attempting to collect through a homeowners
insurance policy.

The policy has an intentional act exclusion.

The defendant, Brad Edwards, plead

guilty

to a negotiated

charge of aggravated assault and was sentenced to the Utah State
Prison.

He signed a "statement by defendant in advance of plea

of guilty."
therein,

The elements of aggravated

to-wit,

"(1)

An

attempt,

assault were

with

unlawful

violence, to do bodily injury to another; and
11

causes serious bodily injury to another.
an

attorney.

He

now

says

in

his

force

or

(b) Intentionally

He was represented by

deposition

intended to scare the other party away.

detailed

that

he

only

In fact, he pointed a

shotgun and fired in the direction of Brandon N. Geary who was
hit in the face, neck, and chest with 132 pellets.
Mr.
Geary.

Edwards

plead

guilty

to

intentionally

injuring

Mr.

He cannot now explain away that plea.

Even if the fact finder believed that Mr. Edwards did not
intend

to

injure

Mr.

Geary,

the

acts

of

Mr.

Edwards

were

intentional.

He intentionally picked up a loaded

intentionally

pointed

intentionally

fired.

it
The

in

the

direction

of

first shot missed.

shotgun.

He

Geary.

He

Mr.
He

intentionally

"medicals

do not apply

fired a second shot which hit Mr. Geary.
The

insurance policy

to...bodily

provides

injury...which

intended...or...which

is

the

that

is
result

either
of

expected

willful

and

or

malicious

acts of an insured...11
Even if Mr. Edwards had not "intended" to hit Mr. Geary, he
could

have

"expected"

that

it

would

happen

considering

his

intentional actions.
The

plaintiff

is

entitled

to

summary

judgment

in

its

declaratory judgment action.
The plaintiff is directed to draw a formal order consistent
with this ruling.
Dated July 8, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to:
Lowell V. Smith
Daniel D. Andersen
P. O. Box 2970
SLC, UT 84110-2970
Dated this %Ul

Robert A. Echard
Key Bank Bldg., Suite 200
2491 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401

day of July 1992.

Deputy q^erk

JUL

Lowell V. Smith, #3006
Daniel D. Andersen, #5907
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
(801) 363-7611
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

BRAD EDWARDS and
BRANDON N. GEARY,

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

ORDER

Civil No: 920700021 CV
Judge Douglas Cornaby

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before this
Court for oral argument on July 7, 1992. Plaintiff was represented
by

its

attorneys

Lowell

V.

Smith

and

Daniel

D.

Andersen.

Defendant, Brandon N. Geary, was represented by his attorney Robert
A. Echard.

Defendant Brad Edwards did not appear either through

counsel nor in person.

Oral argument was presented to the Court.

The Court took the Motion under advisement.
Based on the memoranda of law submitted by the parties
and on the oral argument, and being fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;

r\ A A f\ n i ft

2.

The acts of Brad Edwards are found to fall within
the exclusionary coverage of the homeowner's policy
which states:
Coverage L [Personal Liability] and Coverage M
[Medical Payments to Others] to not apply to:
A.
Bodily injury or property damage:
(1) Which is either expected or
intended by an insured; or
(2) To any person or property which
is the result of willful and
malicious acts of an insured.

3.

Plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,

owes no duty of indemnification for the acts of Brad Edwards and
the claims of Brandon N. Geary, as set forth in the underlying
action, Geary v. Edwards, Case No. 900747669 PI.
4.

Plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,

owes no duty of defense to Brad Edwards in the underlying action,
Geary v. Edwards, Case No. 900747669 PI.
DATED this

22.

day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered this
l(r" day of July, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to the following:
Robert A. Echard
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Blvd
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant Geary

-3-

KEVIN P. SULLIVAN (#3871) of
FARR, KAUFMAN, HAMILTON,
SULLIVAN, GORMAN & PERKINS
Attorneys for Defendant
205 26th Street, Suite 34
Bamberger Square Building
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-5526
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
/

STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT IN
ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY

/

Plaintiff,
/

vs.
•

•

/

Case No. 891706590 FS
JUDGE: RODNEY S. PAGE

BRAD EDWARDS,
/

Defendant.
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised
of and that I understand the following facts and rights, and that
I have had the assistance of counsel in reviewing, explaining, and
completing this form:
1.

The

explained.

nature

of

the

charges

against

me have been

I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the

charges with my attorney, and I understand the charges and the
elements

which

the government

is

required

to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt.
2.

As explained, I am charged with crimes in Meh&x County

as follows:
CRIME
Attempted Homicide

CLASS QR DEGREE
2nd Degree

STATUTORY PENALTY
1-15; $10,000 an
additional 0-5 years
to run consecutively

STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No.
Statement in Advance of Plea

3.
possibility

It
of

has

been

entering

discussed

a plea

of

891706590

with

the

guilty

to

prosecutor

the

the charges as

follows:
CRIME

CLASS OR DEGREE

Aggravated Assault
4.

3rd Degree

STATUTORY PENALTY
0-5; $5,000

I understand that the elements of the offense the State

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are:
(1)

An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; and

(b)

Intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another.

5.

I know that I can be represented by an attorney at

every stage of the proceeding, and I have retained the law firm of
FARR, KAUFMAN, HAMILTON, SULLIVAN, GORMAN & PERKINS to represent
me in this matter.
6.

I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty", and

I know that if I do plead "not guilty", I can persist in that
plea.
7.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that

if I were to stand trial by a jury:
(a)

I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every

stage of the proceeding.
(15J

1 Rave a right" t*o see and observe the witnesses who

testify against me.

STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS

-

Case No.

891706590

Statement in Advance of Plea

(c) My attorney can cross-examine all witnesses who
testify against me.
(d)

I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can

obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of
those witnesses.
(e)

I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not

have to testify at any trial.
(f)

If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told

that no

inference

adverse

to me may be drawn from my

failure to testify.
(g) The government must prove each and every element of
the

offense(s)

charged

against me beyond

a reasonable

doubt.
(h)

It requires a unanimous verdict of a jury to convict

me.
(i)

If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I

cannot afford to appeal, the government will pay the costs
of the appeal including the services of appointed counsel.
8.

I have discussed my constitutional rights to a jury

trial with my attorney.

I understand all the rights listed in

paragraphs 7(a) through 7(i), and it is my desire to waive those

rights.

6- £>
Defendant's I n i t i a l s

3

STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS

-

Case No.

8917 06590

Statement in Advance of Plea

9.

Under a plea of guilty, there will not be a trial of

any kind, and I am waiving my rights and admitting that I am
guilty of the crime to which my plea is entered•
10.

I hereby acknowledge and waive the following rights:

(a)

I waive the right to have a jury trial.

(b)

I waive the right to see and observe the witnesses who

testify against me.
(c)

I waive the right to have my attorney cross-examine

the State witnesses.
(d)

I waive the right to put on a defense and call

witnesses on my behalf,
(e)

I waive my right against self-incrimination and hereby

admit that I am guilty to the charge.
(f)

I waive my right to make the State prove each and

every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(g)

I waive my right to have a unanimous jury verdict to

convict me.
I have discussed my constitutional right to a jury trial
with my attorney.

I understand my rights, and hereby acknowledge

and waive all the rights listed in paragraph 10a through lOg.

6.£.
Defendant's initials

4

STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No,
Statement in Advance of Plea

11.

891706590

I understand that by pleading guilty that there is no

appellate review of any lawful sentence imposed under a plea of
guilty,
12.

No

agreements

have

been

reached,

and

no

representations have been made to me as to what the sentence will
be.
I understand that sentencing is left to the judge, and that
the State and defense cannot 'bargain concerning the sentence.
Defendants initials
13.

I know that under the Laws of Utah, the possible

maximum sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of
guilty to the charge identified on page two of the agreement, are
set out in paragraph three above.

I also know that if I am on

probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of
which I have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences
being imposed upon me.
14.

I know that under a plea of guilty the Judge may ask

me questions about the offense to which the plea is entered.
15.

The only plea agreement which has been entered into

with the Government is:
That the State will reduce the 2nd degree felony to a'3rd
degree felony and dismiss the firearm enhancement. That
the State will recommend no jail or prison and recommend
that the Defendant be placed on probation. The State would
5

STATE OF UTAH V, EDWARDS - Case No.
Statement in Advance of Plea

891706590

further recommend that the Defendant be ordered into a
counseling program which may be supervised by the District
Court or Juvenile Court.
The State would join with the
Defendant in a motion for 4 02 treatment at time of
sentencing.

STEVEN V. MAJOR
attorney for
for IPlaintiff
Attorney
16.

Defendant's Initials

I have a right to ask the Court any questions I

wish to ask concerning my rights, or about these proceeding and
the plea.
*

*

*

*

*

*

I make the following representations to the Court:
1.

//

I am

fey

years of age.

tf&aAOJ

My education consists of

. I

C#st^

r e a d and

(can - cannot)
understand English.
2.

No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me

to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea.
3.

No one has told me that I would receive probation or

any other form of leniency because of my plea.
4.

I have discussed the case and this plea with my lawyer

as much as I wish to.
5.

I am satisfied with my lawyer.

6.

My decision to enter this plea was made after full and

careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full
understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the
6

STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No.
Statement in Advance of Plea

891706590

case and the consequences of the plea.

I was' not under the

influences

intoxicants ^when the

of

any drugs, medication, or

decision to enter the plea was made, and I am not now under the
influences of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants.
7.

I have no mental reservations concerning the plea.

DATED this

£*f

day of January, 1990.

BRAD EDWARDS
Defendant
I certify that I have discussed this statement with the
Defendant; that I have fully explained his/her rights to him/her
and have assisted him/her in completing this form.

I believe that

he/she is knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea with full
knowledge of his/her legal rights, and that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
DATED this

day of January, 1990.

KEVIN P. SULLIVAN
Attorney for defendant
ORDER
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged in the
presence of the undersigned Judge.

7

STATE OF UTAH V, EDWARDS - Case No.
Statement in Advance of Plea

891706590

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement
by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, the. Court finds the
Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made

and it

is ordered that Defendant's plea of "guilty" to the charge set
forth in the agreement be accepted and entered.
DONE in Court this

<3H~^

day of January, 1990.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRANDON N. GEARY,,
vs.

]
>
;
]

BRAD EDWARDS and,
CHRISTOPHER ORCHARD,

|
]

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

SPECIAL VERDICT

Case No.

900747669

]

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence.

If you find the evidence

preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes.11

If

you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer
"No."

Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Was the defendant, Brad Edwards, negligent as alleged

by plaintiff?
Yes ^
2.

No

Was Brad Edward's negligence a proximate cause of the

injuries sustained by the plaintiff?

Yes Y

No

,:i//:

3.

Was the defendant, Christopher Orchard,

contributorily negligent?
Yes /^
4.

No

Was Christopher Orchard's contributory negligence a

proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries?

Yes J\
5.

No

Was the plaintiff, Brandon Geary, contributorily

negligent, as alleged by the defendant?
Yes^
6.

No

Was Brandon Geary's negligence approximate cause of

plaintiff's injuries?

7.

Considering the fault of all the parties whom you

have found to be responsible for this incident, what percentage
of fault is attributable to each:
A.

Plaintiff (Brandon Geary)

B.

Defendant (Brad Edwards)

C.

Defendant (Christopher Orchard)
TOTAL

/

J

%

%
100%

8,

If you have answered Questions 2 and 4, "Yes, state

the amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by
the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries.
questions were not answered
Special Damages:

lf

Yes', do not answer this question.
$.

General Damages:
TOTAL

If such

S

66,5:3?,?{
i

DATED t h i s 2 3 r d d a y of O c t o b e r ,

19,92

